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ENERGY CRISES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
GERALD D. NASH*
INTRODUCTION
The energy crises that engulfed Americans in the 1970s acted like
a shock wave to alert them to the fact that the nation's available sup-
ply of natural resources would be increasingly limited in the last two
decades of the 20th century. The Arab Oil Boycott of 1974 and the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 in particular contributed to growing in-
security about access to cheap, plentiful petroleum deposits. This
concern was reflected in a plethora of "solutions" to the energy
problem by scores of real or imagined experts during the 1970s.' To
channel and institutionalize responses to the problem Congress in
1974 authorized creation of the Federal Energy Administration and
elevated it in 1977 to a cabinet-level agency, the Department of En-
ergy.2 President Carter, in a play of rhetoric, "declared war" on the
energy crisis. His goal was to mobilize public opinion behind a na-
tional program to cope with a developing dilemma for Americans-
increased consumption and shrinking resources.3
Much of the debate over energy in the 1970s tended to be present-
minded. Public officials as well as publicists tended to stress the crisis
"here and now," either unaware of other energy crises which the
United States had confronted in previous years or unwilling to
acknowledge the relevance of the past to the issues of the 1970s.1
Perhaps this anti-historical mood was a product of the recently con-
*B.A., New York University, M.A. Columbia University, Ph.D., University of California,
Berkeley. Professor of History, University of New Mexico.
1. See, e.g., FORD FOUNDATION, EXPLORING ENERGY CHOICES (1974); HUD-
SON INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR COAL DEVELOPMENT AT A WAR-TIME
URGENCY LEVEL TO MEET THE GOALS OF PROJECT INDEPENDENCE (1974); E.
COPP, REGULATING COMPETITION IN OIL: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE
U.S. REFINING INDUSTRY 1948-1975 (1978).
2. On creation of the Federal Energy Administration, see N.Y. Times, May 8, 1974, at
48, col 1.
3. On President Carter's speech, see N.Y. Times, April 21, 1977, at 25, col. 1; on crea-
tion of Department of Energy, see N.Y. Times, August 5, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
4. The literature is enormous For samples, see Monaghan, Is the US. Facing up to a
"National Energy risis"? 86 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 32 (Sept. 24, 1970); Lekachman, Energy
and the American Future: The Case for Nationalization, 34 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 30
(March 4, 1974); Backer, Some Comments on Our Energy Problems, 121 AM. PHILOSOPH-
ICAL SOC'Y PROC. 275 (Aug. 12, 1977).
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cluded Vietnam war, in which both supporters and critics tended to
ignore past experience. Whatever the reason, few of those partici-
pating in discussion or planning of energy resource policy in the
1970s chose to give much emphasis to the experience of the past as
one guideline for present and future planning. Such neglect is unfor-
tunate, for the rich reservoir of past experience can provide valuable
insights that can guide the formulation of pragmatic approaches to
energy problems in the remaining years of the 20th century.
In the light of history the energy crises of the 1970s were neither
unique nor unprecedented. America's energy problem had been in
the making for more than six decades and was a direct result of pub-
lic policies and corporate and individual actions taken in preceding
years. The energy crises of the 1970s were not totally unique; they
were only several links of a chain of energy crises with which Amer-
icans had had to cope since the first world war. Moreover, by the
1970s Americans, in dealing with energy crises for over half a cen-
tury, had accumulated a fund of experience which could be drawn
upon in charting a future course.
While each of the energy crises before 1970 reflected certain dis-
tinctive elements, at the same time these crises shared similar charac-
teristics. In every instance access to petroleum resources was a major
factor in resolution of the crisis. Moreover, since the early 20th cen-
tury the supply of oil has been closely related to issues related to
national security. This relationship added a sense of urgency to the
procurement of petroleum as the availability of energy resources was
becoming an increasingly essential prerequisite for the nation's eco-
nomic health. In comparing America's energy crises since World War
I the similarity of conditions surrounding them is striking. Any effort
to chart effective public policies in the 1980s cannot afford to ignore
the fund of experience so accumulated.
Clearly, no brief analysis can do justice to an exploration of Amer-
ica's energy experience. But a short survey can delineate some of the
successes and failures that characterized the past efforts of the
United States to deal with a succession of energy problems. This arti-
cle will focus on only three significant oil crises: the critical petro-
leum shortage after World War I; the alarming scarcity of oil during
World War II; and the burgeoning petroleum shortages during the
Cold War in the 19 50s. In every case, the discovery of new sources of
oil prevented serious impairment of the economy or of national sec-
urity. In every case, the lack of a comprehensive national energy pol-
icy sowed the seeds for a future crisis. Will history repeat itself in the
1980s? Will the discovery of new oil resources compensate for the
continued lack of a comprehensive national energy policy in the re-
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maining years of the 20th century? Although an examination of
America's past experience will not provide final answers to such
questions, it may provide a framework for practical responses.
THE POST-WORLD WAR I CRISIS
The United States faced its first oil shortage in the half dozen
years after World War I. During tht conflict, in cooperation with the
oil industry, the Oil Division of the U.S. Fuel Administration under
Mark Requa had established rigid federal controls over the procure-
ment and distribution of petroleum products.' These controls re-
flected the belief of President Woodrow Wilson and his military ad-
visors that an ample supply of oil was necessary for America's
national security because the U.S. Navy was still the nation's first
line of defense. The slogan, "Petroleum Will Win the War," was
already widely accepted by the United States and its allies.6 The
Fuel Administration accomplished its task of providing necessary
supplies by production control, pooling, price stabilization, and con-
servation. With the end of hostilities in November, 1918 President
Wilson ordered the abrupt termination of most wartime agencies, in-
cluding the Fuel Administration."
Unknowingly, Wilson precipitated the energy crisis that gripped
the nation during its difficult post-war readjustments during 1919
and 1920. America's post-war disillusionment was deepened by the
sudden shortage of petroleum supplies. The reasons for this scarcity
were varied. Certainly the disruption of the smoothly functioning
supply and distribution system of the U.S. Fuel Administration was
clearly one important cause of the problem. But the roots of the
shortage were more deeply embedded. The increase in the use of
motor cars and trucks created vast new demands for gasoline. Con-
sumption in the United States was increasing at a rate of approxi-
mately nine percent each year. Moreover by 1920 the Navy had
largely completed its conversion of ships from coal to fuel oil and so
had -become primarily dependent on petroleum.8 At the same time
the prospects for increased domestic production looked gloomy. No
less an expert than the prestigious Director of the U.S. Geological
Survey, George Otis Smith, a distinguished scientist, declared in 1919
that the United States would exhaust its domestic oil supplies in less
5. See U.S. FUEL ADMINISTRATION, PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1918).
6. See G. NASH, U.S. OIL POLICY, 1890-1964: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 29-38 (1968).
7. U.S. FUEL ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REPORT, 1917-1919, at 261-271 (1921).
8. G. NASH, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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than a decade. His dire warnings were reinforced by a current report
from the U.S. Bureau of Mines.9 Industry leaders like Walter C.
Teagle, President of Standard Oil of New Jersey, expressed similar
fears.' 0
The predictions created panic in the heart of Secretary of the Navy
Josephus Daniels. In 1920, with the recent wartime experiences still
fresh in his mind, he ordered U.S. Navy officers to seize all the fuel
oil they needed if, because of rising oil prices, the bids they received
from private suppliers were unreasonable. Under the Lever Act of
191711 the President had broad powers under which such seizures
could be legitimized. The petroleum shortage was particularly acute
on the Pacific Coast. There the Commander of the Pacific Fleet pre-
pared to seize fuel oil owned by the General Petroleum Co. of Los
Angeles, despite an injunction which the company secured from the
federal district court.' 2 In San Francisco where the Union Oil Com-
pany refused to deliver oil to the Navy at $1.60 per barrel, a price
well under prevailing spot prices, six U.S. Navy destroyers drew up to
Associated Oil Company storage facilities with orders to seize as
much oil as they required. After this action the Navy experienced
fewer problems as its procurement officers found suppliers less reluc-
tant to sign contracts.' 3
In the absence of a clearly defined federal energy policy, a number
of affected interest groups took the initiative in 1920 in grappling
with the prevailing petroleum shortage. Navy men fashioned their
own solutions by prevailing on Congress to authorize expansion of
U.S. naval oil reserves such as those at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, and
Elk Hills, California.' ' Congress even instructed the Secretary of the
Navy to consider the acquisition of petroleum wells in foreign nations
to supply the fleet.' I Herbert Hoover and his protege, Mark Requa,
9. Smith, Foreign Oil Supply for the United States, in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS, 65 TRANSACTIONS at 91 (1921). The
George Otis Smith Papers at the University of Wyoming provide extensive corroboration of
Smith's fears during this period.
10. See N.Y. Times, January 5, 1920, at 20, col. 2 and N.Y. Times, January 7, 1920, at
18, col 3.
11. Act of August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. 276.
12. U.S. SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, ANNUAL REPORT 1920 at 1081-82 (1921).
13. For details of these events, see N.Y. Times, March 12, 1920, at 11, col. 4;id., March
17, 1920, at 16, col 5;id., April 17, 1920, at 26, col. 7;id., June 20, 1920, § 2, at 1, col. 7;
id., June 22, 1920, at 4, coL 4;id., July 8, 1920, at 6, coL 5;id., July 27, 1920, at 1, col. 2;
id., July 28, 1920, at 16, coL 3;id., July 30, 1920, at 3, col. 7;id., August 12, 1920, at 1,
coL 4; and id., Sept. 12, 1920, at 3, col. 4.
14. See 66 CONG. REC. 7144 (2d Sess. 1920); N.Y. Times, May 3, 1920, at 22, col. 4;
id., May 17, 1920, at 1, col. 7.
15. See 66 CONG. REC. 1491 (3d Sess. 1921) and N.Y. Times, May 18, 1920, at 23,
col. 2.
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spoke out strongly for an intensive conservation effort and the elimi-
nation of waste.' 6 Many industry leaders, however, saw the explora-
tion of oil resources in foreign countries as the major solution to
America's energy crisis. The Democratic Party platform of 1920 ex-
plicitly incorporated this demand.' "
Between 1921 and 1924 these recommendations for addressing
the energy problem received careful consideration. But they became
enmeshed with the Teapot Dome scandals in the Harding administra-
tion, first revealed in 1922. Teapot Dome, it will be remembered, in-
volved the transfer of naval oil reserves from the Navy Department to
the Department of the Interior so as to award leases to private devel-
opers. President Calvin Coolidge, shrewdly deflecting the unfavorable
publicity generated by Teapot Dome, embraced the cause of oil con-
servation soon after taking office. In 1924 he created the Federal Oil
Conservation Board (FOCB), a Cabinet agency whose prime task it
was to investigate possible conservation policies and to recommend
specific policies to Congress, the states, and the industry.' 8 Com-
posed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, and Commerce, the
FOCB during the next five years held hearings and issued a series of
reports, recommending strict enforcement of oil conservation prac-
tices by states and voluntary programs by industry. It also considered
possible sanctions to be imposed by the federal government to fur-
ther conservation.' 9 Major oil-producing states like Oklahoma and
Texas followed these recommendations and initiated comprehensive
regulation of drilling practices and total annual production.2 0 Even
the major companies in industry were won over to the cause of con-
servation. In 1926 the American Petroleum Institute endorsed a reso-
lution in support of greater efficiency and conservation, not at all
unaware that restriction of production could also lead to higher
prices. 2
16. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1920, at 25, col. 4;id., Jan. 20, 1922, at 7, col. 1.
17. See K. PORTER & D. JOHNSON, AMERICAN PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1960
at 121 (1961).
18. For the text of Pres. Coolidge's statement creating FOCB, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1924, at 1, col. 1. For more background, see letter from Henry L. Doherty to Calvin Cool-
idge (Aug. 24, 1924), recorded in RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL OIL CONSERVATION
BOARD, National Archives, Wash., D.C. [hereinafter cited as FOCB RECORDS].
19. Brief printed summaries of these activities may be found in the Board's Annual Re-
ports (1926-32), recorded in FOCB RECORDS, supra note 18.
20. On E. W. Marland's efforts in Oklahoma, see OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Jan. 20, 1927
and INLAND OIL INDEX, Jan. 28, 1927. On efforts in Texas, see Hardwicke, Legal History
of Conservation of Oil in Texas, in LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL &
GAS 214 (Am. Bar Assn., Section of Mineral Law, eds. 1938).
21. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 1926 PROCEEDINGS at 1-2 and 11-15
(1927). See also NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Dec. 8, 1926.
April 1981]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
With perhaps even greater enthusiasm, spokesmen for the Navy, for
Congress, and for industry, favored the acquisition of oil resources
overseas. Representatives of these interest groups looked with favor
upon three possible areas for the expansion of American influence.
Among the most lucrative during these years was the Middle East,
particularly Persia, where the British and the French had already
gained valuable concessions before the first world war. Another pos-
sibility lay in the Dutch East Indies. Closer to home was Venezuela,
whose oil potential was just becoming apparent. But problems with
President Carranza in Mexico, and the intensification of the Mexican
Revolution during the 1920s, caused Americans to keep hands off its
southern neighbor.2 2
Unfortunately American diplomats did not meet with great suc-
cess. In Mesopotamia the British and French, so recently America's
allies in war, resolutely opposed the participation of American oil
companies in peacetime exploration. The Dutch showed themselves
to be even more hostile to possible American oil exploration in the
East Indies in competition with the Royal Dutch Shell Company.
They vehemently refused to grant necessary permits. Only in Vene-
zuela was the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey able to secure
valuable new drilling rights and to exploit a new source of oil for
American consumers. 2 3
Meanwhile, legislators in the major oil producing states enacted in-
creasingly stringent measures to promote conservation. Texas inaug-
urated regulation of drilling practices in 1899, and California fol-
lowed in 1903, providing effective administration in 1915 by creating
an Office of State Oil and Gas Supervisor. In 1905 Oklahoma, even
before statehood in 1907, adopted the most comprehensive conserva-
tion rules. Many of those who favored conservation practices did so
hoping that by restricting production they could maintain stable
prices. Beginning in 1917, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
began to administer a wide range of regulations not only concerning
the deepening, drilling, and plugging of wells, but also regulating the
total amount of oil produced in the state. In neighboring Texas, the
Railroad Commission was carrying on similar functions during these
same years. 2 4 The threat of petroleum exhaustion had left a lasting
imprint on the laws of most oil producing states.
22. G. NASH, supra note 6, at 49-71.
23. See U.S. SEC'Y OF STATE, RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN PETROLEUM
PROSPECTORS IN CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, S. Doe. No. 272, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1920) and L. FANNING, AMERICAN OIL OPERATIONS ABROAD 49-62 (1947).
24. See generally LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS (Am. Bai
Assn., Section of Mineral Law, eds. 1938) for a competent survey of state legislation.
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But between 1924 and 1929 the severe oil shortage that the scien-
tists had forecast failed to materialize. This was largely because of
vast new discoveries in the United States, largely in the Southwest.
In October 1926, prospectors found new oil deposits in the Seminole
field of Oklahoma and in the Yates field in Texas. By 1931, oil
drillers had discovered the extensive East Texas area, soon to be the
most productive in the nation. These hitherto untapped sources
boosted petroleum production from 442,929 million barrels annually
in 1920 to 1,007,323 million barrels annually just nine years later.
Prices plummeted accordingly. In 1920 crude oil brought $3.50 per
barrel, but the price plunged to only 95 cents by 1930. Along with
causing the business depression, the new supplies transformed the
erstwhile shortage into a debilitating glut.2
Thus, Americans weathered the oil crisis of the post-World War I
decade through a combination of good luck and discovery of new re-
sources. The oil crisis of that era showed that the nation lacked a
comprehensive peacetime energy policy. In the absence of federal
guidelines, various affected interest groups, including industry, the
U.S. Navy, and state lawmakers in oil producing states, sought to fill
the vacuum. They attempted more aggressive exploration for oil
overseas, developed plans for more effective oil conservation prac-
tices, and instituted intensive state regulation. Yet, the oil shortage
was ended only by immense new discoveries in the Southwest. Dis-
covered on the threshold of the Great Depression, these extensive
finds created new problems-problems of surplus rather than of
shortage.
THE WORLD WAR II CRISIS
Participation in World War II precipitated another oil crisis as the
demands of America's armed forces and allies outstripped supply.
Domestic production suddenly proved insufficient to meet existing
needs, particularly as President Roosevelt called for the production
of more than 100,000 airplanes yearly. 26 In the heat of conflict, the
Roosevelt administration was thus eager to formulate a national oil
policy to deal with the crisis.2 7 This was particularly true of Secre-
tary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who in 1935 unsuccessfully advo-
25. See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, PETROLEUM FACTS & FIGURES
213 (1959).
26. This situation alarmed Congress. See Hearings on H.R. 7372 and H.R Res. 290 Be-
fore the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939-40).
27. G. NASH, supra note 6, at 158-59.
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cated strict control of the oil industry, and in 1940 supported federal
anti-trust suits to break up integrated companies.2 8 Because the
European war created problems that led to fuel shortages in the
United States, on May 28, 1941, the President designated Ickes as
Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense.2" His assignment was
to undertake an inventory of available reserves, to organize industry
representatives in advisory committees, and to pool available sup-
plies.3 0 Ickes threw himself into these new responsibilities with his
accustomed energy. Within a few months he was also at odds with
Attorney General Francis Biddle over suspension of pending anti-
trust suits against major oil companies. Ickes sought legalization of
voluntary pooling arrangements by the major companies, and with
the President's support, won his point.3 At the same time he used
his influence with the War Production Board to secure special priori-
ties for scarce materials.3 2 Moreover, before Pearl Harbor Ickes suc-
ceeded in securing loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion for the construction of 100-octane refineries to provide aviation
fuel. That commodity was in critically short supply, particularly in
view of Roosevelt's extensive aircraft construction program.3 3 With
lesser success Ickes sought to curb U.S. oil exports to Japan, for he
ran afoul of Secretary Cordell Hull and the State Department. But
his energetic activity contributed to the easing of domestic shortages.
Despite opposition from the nation's railroads, he accomplished con-
struction of the Big Inch and Little Inch Pipelines by the federal gov-
ernment, thereby easing a shortage of tanker railroad cars as well as
seagoing tankers.3 Thus between 1939 and 1942 Ickes took various
steps that succeeded in meeting the nation's crucial petroleum needs.
But the momentum of American participation in the conflict
placed increasing strains on available petroleum resources. Ickes felt
he could meet the challenge only if the President extended his author-
ity. Hence in December 1942 he prevailed upon Roosevelt to appoint
28. On Ickes and federal controls, see OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, June 20, 1935. On
anti-trust action, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
29. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes (May 28, 1941), recorded in
RECORDS OF THE DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, National Archives, Wash., D.C. [herein-
after cited as DI RECORDS].
30. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1941, at 1, coL 3 and G. NASH, supra note 6, at 159-61.
31. On anti-trust, see letter from Francis Biddle to Harold L. Ickes (June 18, 1941), re-
corded in DI RECORDS, supra note 29.
32. See memorandum from Samuel Rosenman to Franklin D. Roosevelt (March 14,
1942), recorded in FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT PAPERS, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. [hereinafter cited as ROOSEVELT PAPERS].
33. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1941, at 35, col. 1 and id., Nov. 28, 1941, at 15, col 3.
34, For Ickes' own account of the events, see generally H. ICKES, FIGHTIN' OIL
(1943). See also H. ICKES, 3 SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE LOWERING
CLOUDS 529-31 (1974).
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him Petroleum Administrator for War with vastly enlarged powers. In
a move to centralize national oil policy so as to maximize production,
Ickes expanded federal activities. These included the stimulation of
new drilling through subsidies and tax advantages, encouragement of
accelerated scientific research, and enforcement of conservation prac-
tices. 3 5
During the second world war, however, American policy makers
became aware that domestic oil reserves would no longer meet the
nation's energy needs. Between 1940 and 1950 domestic consumption
of crude petroleum increased from 1,326,486 barrels to 2,375,057
barrels annually. Exports shrank from 130,940 barrels to 111,306
barrels during the period, while petroleum imports in 1940 and 1950
rose from 83,751 to 310,261 (thousands of 42-gallon barrels respec-
tively).' 6 Domestic consumption was now outpacing domestic pro-
duction. Secretary Ickes became aware of the situation as early as
1941 when he warned Roosevelt that the United States might have
only a 15-year reserve supply and recommended that "thought...
be taken concerning the future of the United States with respect to
oil." In forwarding a special report to the President on the eve of
Pearl Harbor he noted in addition that "the United States must have
extra-territorial reserves to guard against the day when our steadily
increasing demand can no longer be met by our domestic supply. '3 I
Ickes proceeded to take action without delay. In December 1941
he created a Foreign Oil Committee composed of nine executives
from major oil companies having foreign interests.3" He also urged
the President to authorize American government sponsored oil ex-
plorations in Mexico. That recommendation was opposed by Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull, and by the chairman of the War Produc-
tion Board, Donald Nelson.3 9 Roosevelt did agree however, along
with E. L. De Golyer, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Petro-
35. For a contemporary account of these events, see J. FREY & H. IDE, HISTORY OF
THE PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR (1946).
36. These figures are adapted from AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, FACTS
AND FIGURES 284-85 (1971).
37. Letter from Harold L. Ickes to Franklin D. Roosevelt (December 1, 1941), recorded
in RECORDS OF THE PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR, National Archives,
Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as PAW RECORDS].
38. Letter from Harold L Ickes to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (October 18, 1941) and
memo by Ralph K. Davies, Deputy Administrator of Petroleum Administration for War (Oc-
tober 15, 1941), both recorded in PAW RECORDS, supra note 37. The Committee's work is
discussed in J. FREY & H. IDE, supra note 35, at 250-74.
39. Letter from Harold L Ickes to Franklin D. Roosevelt (December 3, 1941); letter
from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes (February 28, 1942); letter from Harold L.
Ickes to Cordell Hull (August 4, 1942), all recorded in DI RECORDS, supra note 29. See
also memorandum from James F. Byrnes to Franklin D. Roosevelt on Foreign Oil Situation
(October 4, 1943), recorded in ROOSEVELT PAPERS, supra note 32.
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leum Administration for War, that the center of the international oil
industry was shifting to the Middle East.4"
In fact, many officials in the Roosevelt administration were begin-
ning to look to the Middle East as America's salvation. In a study
prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1943 the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations estimated proven United States reserves to be 20
billion barrels, and those of the Middle East at more than 56 billion
barrels.4 1 American foreign policy thus shifted to the development
of closer ties with the Middle East. On December 14, 1942, Paul H.
Ailing, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the State De-
partment, urged Lend-Lease Aid to Saudi Arabia in order to cement
closer relationships. It "gives every promise of being one of the
world's most important oil fields," he wrote, and to the United
States it had an "interest of the highest importance." 4 2 This memo-
randum made its way to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson and
ultimately to President Roosevelt who gave it his approval. 4 3 Mean-
while, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board investigated long-range
petroleum sources for the armed forces and made a gloomy forecast.
To increase U.S. oil supplies its members urbed the Joint Chiefs to
increase refinery capacity in Colombia, Venezuela, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia. 44 But clearly the Middle East now beckoned as America's
most potent future source of oil.
By 1943 Roosevelt's cabinet was formulating a consensus on
American oil policy overseas. On July 14 of that year the President
called the members together to map out strategy for meeting the na-
tion's wartime petroleum needs. They agreed that the federal govern-
ment itself establish a corporation to prospect for oil in Saudi Arabia.
This new enterprise would supplement the production of the Arabian-
American Oil Company (Aramco) and other private corporations. In
addition, they recommended an agreement with the British that
would allow Americans to search for oil in Middle Eastern areas from
which the British had previously excluded them.4 s
40. See Diary of Harold L. Ickes (entry dated Feb. 20, 1943), recorded in ICKES MANU-
SCRIPTS, Library of Congress, Wash., D.C.
41. Conant & Gold, Geopolitics of Energy 33 (Jan. 1977) (report prepared for the Dept.
of Defense), reprinted in SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Energy Pub. No. 95-1; Comm. Print 1977).
42. Memorandum from Paul H. Ailing to Asst. Sec'ys of State A. A. Berle and Dean
Acheson (Dec. 14, 1942), recorded in RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
National Archives, Wash., D.C.
43. C. HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1512 (1948).
44. Minutes of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board (April 21, 1943), recorded in JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF DECIMAL FILES (1942-47), RECORD GROUP 218, National Ar-
chives, Washington, D.C.
45. See Hearings before the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National De-
fense Program (Part 41: Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia), 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
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But during the next few years neither of these carefully laid plans
succeeded. On July 1, 1943, the President directed the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation to create the Petroleum Reserves Corpora-
tion and appointed Ickes as chairman. 4 6 Ickes now made an effort to
purchase all or a portion of the Saudi Arabian concessions owned by
Cal-Tex, a joint venture in Saudi Arabia of the Standard Oil Com-
pany of California and the Texas Company. But both Harry D. Col-
lier and W. S. S. Rodgers, the chairmen of Cal-Tex, were furious at
the suggestion. The Foreign Oil Committee of the Petroleum Admin-
istration for War was similarly outraged, and the directors of the In-
dependent Petroleum Association of America staunchly denounced
government-owned production overseas.4 7 On the floor of Congress
bitter debates ensued over the proposed new policy; and members of
the powerful Special Committee to Investigate Defense Expenditures
urged primary dependence on private enterprise.4 8 Amidst this furor
President Roosevelt decided in May, 1944 to deactivate the Petroleum
Reserves Corporation and to abandon plans for direct government in-
volvement in Saudi Arabian oil production.4 9
At the same time the administration inaugurated discussions with
the British concerning an Anglo-American oil agreement. On March
7, 1944, Under-Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius announced
that the President had appointed Cordell Hull and Harold Ickes as
chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the United States delega-
tion to an Anglo-American Oil Conference to be held in Washington
in the following month.' 0 After extensive technical discussions the
at 24,861, 25,243, and 25,244 (1948) [hereinafter cited as TRUMAN COMMITTEE HEAR-
INGS]. Concerning the Anglo-American treaty, see generally M. STOFF, OIL, WAR, &
AMERICAN SECURITY: THE SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL POLICY ON FOREIGN OIL
1941-1947 (1980).
46. See TRUMAN COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 45, at 25,237-38 and 80
CONG. REC. 4961-62 (1947). Ickes hoped the Corporation would be in the Dept. of Inter-
ior. See letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes (July 30, 1943), recorded in
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group hammered out a draft treaty by July, and by late August 1944
the President sent it to the Senate. The agreement defined mutual
British-American interests in the Middle East and provided for joint
collaboration on the construction of new pipelines.' 1 But a storm of
protest met the publication of the agreement in the United States.
Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, spoke for many independent oil producers who opposed
ratification because they feared the competition of cheap imported
petroleum.' 2 Despite revisions in the treaty which Ickes and an
American delegation negotiated in London during September, oppo-
sition to it did not abate. Several efforts to secure ratification of the
treaty during the next five years proved futile, and by 1952 the State
Department abandoned it."
The end of hostilities in 1945 relieved some of the greatest pres-
sures on available American oil supplies. Yielding to the entreaties of
representatives from industry, by 1946 the Truman administration
abandoned most wartime agencies as well as nascent efforts to de-
velop a comprehensive national energy policy. With the decreasing
petroleum needs of the armed forces the supplies available for domes-
tic consumption averted immediate shortages. At the same time
Aramco and other American oil companies increased their production
in the Middle East so that their exports to the U.S. were more than
ample in shoring up declining American reserves. Even so, in 1950 oil
imports accounted for less than 10 percent of total national con-
sumption.14 As southwestern oil reserves had rescued the United
States from an oil crisis after World War I, so Saudi Arabian oil re-
serves rescued the nation from a similar dilemma during and imme-
diately after World War II.
THE COLD WAR CRISIS
The American people thus entered the decade of the 1950s with-
out a comprehensive national energy policy and became increasingly
reliant on Middle Eastern oil imports to fill the growing gap between
domestic consumption and production. With the Cold War dictating
the maintenance of a significant military-industrial complex, the
51. The text of the treaty can be found at 91 CONG. REC. 10,323-24 (1945). For an
excellent discussion of the treaty, see generally M. STOFF, supra note 45.
52. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1944, at 40, col. 1; id., Jan. 11, 1945, at 11, col. 1; id.,
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53. G. NASH, supra note 6, at 178-79. See generally M. STOFF, supra note 45.
54. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, supra note 25, at 213 (citing data ob-
tained from the U.S. Bureau of Mines).
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Eisenhower administration decided to maintain a potential stored oil
reserve equal to about 20 percent of annual domestic production.5 s
More than ever, the United States was becoming dependent on Mid-
dle Eastern oil.
With his characteristic penchant for delegation President Eisen-
hower in 1954 appointed a cabinet committee on energy supplies to
consider the problem of potential oil shortages and imports.5 6 Com-
posed of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Commerce, and
State, and the Director of Defense Mobilization, the committee rec-
ommended in the following year that importing oil served the na-
tional interest. But the committee noted that producers should estab-
lish voluntary import restrictions to maintain a balance so as not to
depress domestic production. They hoped also that the industry
would maintain imports at then current levels-approximately two
percent of total annual consumption. Voluntary restrictions broke
down within a year, however. The Suez Crisis of 1956 panicked
Americans into a search for oil, regardless of its source.5 7 President
Eisenhower became sufficiently concerned in 1957 to appoint a spe-
cial committee to investigate crude oil imports.5 " This group recom-
mended lessened reliance on foreign oil, urging a level 10 percent be-
low the 1954 figures. Unfortunately, voluntary oil import restrictions
were not very effective, and in March 1959 President Eisenhower
announced a mandatory oil import program under which the Secre-
tary of the Interior could establish quotas and grant licenses to im-
porters.5 " Thus, American dependence on Middle Eastern oil was
institutionalized as the now chronic gap between lagging domestic
production and increasing consumption created the potential for
other energy crises in the future.
CONCLUSION
A cursory survey of selected oil crises in America's past reveals cer-
tain similarities. Throughout the 20th century, the United States has
lacked a clear coherent national energy policy. With the exception of
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and G. NASH, supra note 6, at 202-206.
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war years, public policy was composed of a succession of disparate
responses to immediate or short range problems. United States oil
policy consisted of a melange of oddly assorted measures, accumu-
lated in an eclectic fashion, resembling nothing so much as a crazy
quilt, with clashing or conflicting components. That this policy did
not result in a major breakdown in American oil supplies was hardly
due to the sagacity and foresight of the framers of American oil pol-
icy. Rather, it was dependent on the timely discovery of hitherto un-
tapped resources, either in the United States or overseas, particularly
in the Middle East. As the world's most affluent nation in the 20th
century the United States was cushioned from the shock of a severe
oil crisis.
Whether the United States can continue to rely on such luck in an
era of restricted rather than seemingly unlimited petroleum resources
is obviously problematical. Although the circumstances affecting re-
curring historical patterns may not be identical, they do reflect per-
sistent continuities. No generation can afford to ignore this experi-
ence if it seeks realistic solutions to its problems. In the remaining
decades of the 20th century new petroleum reserves will surely be
uncovered. But whether these will be great enough to keep up with
the seemingly insatiable energy demands of Americans and a bur-
geoning world population is unlikely. Moreover, the burdens of poli-
tical involvements generated by reliance on foreign oil are only now
beginning to be realized by a growing number of Americans.
These considerations lend a sense of urgency to the need for for-
mulating a comprehensive national energy policy. Such a policy
would not necessarily mandate a greater federal involvement in the
management of the nation's energy resources. Rather, it would
crystallize a clear understanding of national goals and priorities in re-
lation to the use of energy. And no less important, such a program
would need to be explained in an effective manner to the American
people.
National policy would delineate the respective roles of private and
public enterprise in the achievement of these goals. Unless vast new
petroleum reserves are discovered, without a clear national energy
policy and sense of direction, the United States will face the most
serious energy crisis in its history. To ignore the past is to live peri-
lously in the future.
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